Deceased
Madison Lee Dobie
Demographics
2y, female
Coroner
Coroner Heather Spooner
Date of death
2009-04-16
Finding date
2011-03-30
Cause of death
Massive head injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident (bus rollover)
AI-generated summary
A V-Line passenger coach rolled over on the Princes Highway near Heathmere, Victoria on 16 April 2009, killing three occupants: Ms Sabrina Brady (7 months pregnant), her 2-year-old daughter Madison, and Mr Justin Pomery. The coroner found the poor road surface condition—characterised by bleeding, polishing, rutting and loss of friction—was the primary contributing factor. None of the three deceased were wearing seatbelts despite their availability. The coroner found that child restraints should have been provided for young children, that VicRoads' maintenance and hazard-management systems failed despite prior warnings, and that seatbelt compliance education needed strengthening. Road improvements, notably waterblasting, were only performed after the incident despite prior inspections identifying the hazard.
AI-generated summary — refer to original finding for legal purposes. Report an inaccuracy.
Error types
Rule 6001)
Court Refertnce: 2039/09
Section 67 of the Coroners Act 2008
Inquest into the Death of MADISON LICK DOBIE
Delivered On:
Delivered At:
Hearing Dates:
Findings of:
Place of death/Suspected
Representation:
30 March 2011
Coroners Court, Level 11, 222 Exhibition Street, Melbourne
2 August 2010 — Directions Hearin g 6, 7 and 8 October 2010 and 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 December 2010
Coroner Heather Spooner
Princess Highway, Heathmere, Victoria 3305
Leading Senior Constable Remo Antolini
Ms S Hinchloy for VicRoads and
‘The Department of Transport
Mr T Keely for Warrnambool Bus Lines Mr J Atkins for Mr Maxwell Shayler Mr Rattray for Iveco
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Court Reference: 2039/09
FORM 37 Rute 60(1)
FINDING INTO DEATH WITH INQUEST Section 67 of the Coroners Act 2008 In the Coroners Court of Victoria at Melbourne
1 Heather Spooner Coroner having investigated the death of:
Details of deceased:
Surname: , DOBIE First name: MADISON Address: 1 Ifawong Drive, Mount Gambier, South Australia 5291
AND having held an inquest in relation to this death on 6, 7 and 8 October 2010, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 December 2010 and 30 March 2011 at Melbourne ‘
Find: that the identity of the deceased was Madison Lee Dobie And: that the death occurred on 16" April, 2009 At: Princess Highway, Heathmere, Victoria 3305 From: la, MASSIVE HEAD INJURIES . 1b. MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT (BUS)
Tn the following circumstances:
Date and Place of Death
L. ‘The death of Madison Dobie aged 2 years, occurred at Princes Highway,
Heathinere on 16 April 2009,
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Circumstances Surrounding Death
The road surface was in poor condition, The posted speed was 100kph and a VicRoads advisory sign located approximately 700 metres south warned of slippery
conditions when wet,
__ departed Portland.
4, On this fateful evening, the coach entered a sweeping right hand bend and Mr Shayler lost traction/controt as it travelled in a straight line onto the opposite south ‘bound lane. Mr Donald Marshall who was driving his Toyota Hilux in a southerly ‘direction on the Princes Highway, saw lights and a large mass coming toward him.
Mr Shayler also saw Mr Marshall’s vehicle and in an attempt to regain control and — avoid the oncoming traffic, he oversteered the coach to the left. Mr Marshall also moved to his far left and heard a ‘whoosh’ as the coach passed close by. Mts Marshall who was travelling behind her husband saw it pass within centimetres of his vehicle, The coach rotated and rolled over, leaving the bitumen road surface and landing on the driver’s (off) side, It eventually came to rest ona grassy culvert on the
left western side of the highway.
drivers (off) side of the coach. During the rollover, five passengers were ejected or
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partially ejected from the coach. Ms Brady who was seven months pregnant, ler
young daughter Madison and Mr Pomery, all sustained fatal injuries. °
were not wearing any form of restraint. In fact. only five of the cleven passengers
wore lap sash seatbelts as required.
Portland Hospital with minor injuries.
restriction signs were erected soon after the coach incident.
Issues at Inquest
low compliance rate,
Investigations
Carnie. He prepared an extensive coronial brief and organised two site visits on 28
July and & October 2010, with the support of local Portland police members.
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Investigator (OCI report)! also became available.
12, This finding does not summarise all the extremely detailed investigations and
reports but is based on the material and the evidence at inquest.
The Roadway and Incident Inspection
contributing factor to the incident.
Princes Highway at Heathmere where the incident occurred:
“Tt is defined as a road-related area under the Road Safety Act and has ‘a restricted speed limit of 100 kin/h. The Princes Highway lies in a general north/south direction, At the location of the collision there is provision for one lane of traffic in each direction. These lanes are divided by a double solid white centre lines with tactile strips. For vehicles travelling in a northerly direction
on approach to the collision scene they enter a sweeping right hand curve.
The south bound lane is defined to the east by a single white fog line with tactile strips. There is a bitten shoulder ta the east of this fog line which abuts onto a grass reservation with small shrubs growing on it. To the east of this grass reservation is farming land. The south bound lane is approximately 3:5 metres
in width,
' www. transport.vic,gov.au... http://www.transport, vic. gov.au/chicfinvestigator Since the Coroners Act 2008 became opcrational, access to the coronial file may be sought pursuant to section 115 of the Act ‘
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The northbound lane is defined to the west by a single white fog line with tactile strips. There is a bitumen shoulder to the west of this fog line. At the bitumen edge is a “W” steel barrier, which follows the full length of the right hand curve. There are a number of large shrubs and trees growing to west of this barrier. This barrier commences to the north of a turn out road which allows
access to farming properties and a bus stop. This turn out road is located to the
south of the right curve and to the west of the bitumen surface, ft is
approximately 400 metres in length and runs parallel to the highway before re-
joining the highway to the north of the collision scene. At the collision scene
there is a large grassed area and culvert between the north bound lane and the
turnout lane. The northbound lane is approximately 3.8 metres in width,
The Princes Highway is constructed of a bituminous substance, When police investigators examined the road surface they formed the opinion that it was in
poor condition,
There were three different surfaces with a high variation in skid resistance within a small area near the collision scene. Approximately 28 metres south of where the coach left the road, the road surface in the north bound lane changed significantly. The section most northerly in the north bound lane was in relatively good condition and appeared to have been recently resurfaced, The south end section of the north bound lane had suffered extensive bleeding with large and plentiful areas of polished road surface. The south bound lanes displayed a different road surface. Although it did not appear to have been recently resurfaced the south bound lane was in better condition than the north bound lane. Within the right curve prior to the collision scene and in the straight approaching the scene in the north bound lane, deep ruts were evident in ad number of areas, The maximum rut depth was measured at 36.0mm, These
ruts displayed large areas of water pooling.
An examination of the scene located a number of tyre scuff marks. The marks commenced on the bitumen in the south bound lane and continued back across the north bound lane and onto the bitumen shoulder of the west side of the road.
These tyre scuff marks were in the form of yaw marks and curved to the left.
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these yaw marks led to the continuation of a series of tyre marks leading into the grassed culvert. The yaw marks are consistent with the coach being over steered to the left. The marks then cease but lead to the point of impact between the coach and the embankment on the west side of the culvert. It was evident
| from the cessation of these marks that the bus became airborne across the culvert. ‘North of the yaw mark in the north bound lane and west bitumen shoulder are three significant gouges. Measurements of these gouges are consistent with the pillars at the roofline of the coach. The gouges are - consistent with having been caused by the impact between the coach and the road during roll over, The three marks were the result of impact with the road and the rear corner at the roofline, the pillar dividing the sixth and sevenths windows of the coach at the roofline and the pillar dividing the fifth and sixth windows of the bus at the roofline all on the driver side. These gouges led to further gouges and scrapes leading from the north bound lane, across the west bitumen and gravel shoulder and into the grassed culvert to the rest position of the coach, These scrapes and gouges are consistent with the coach having rolled onto the driver side and then continuing to slide on the driver side whilst: rotating in an anti clockwise direction. On the west side of the grass culvert were two areas of significant gouging in the dirt, These gouges are consistent ~ with having been caused by the initial impact of the front driver side corner of the coach after being airborne and then the secondary tmpuci with the jront
driver side corner roofline during roll over.
A reconstruction of the collision revealed the coach would have been travelling between a minimum speed of 55 km/h and a maximum speed of 73 km/h when it
was oversteered to the left.”
she indicated:
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“The driver of the’ vehicle negotiated a right curve before the vehicle has crossed onto the incorrect side of the road for an unknown reason, The driver of the coach has then responded by inputting a severe left steering manoeuvre causing the vehicle to commence to yaw. The coach has rotated in an anticlockwise direction about its vertical axis while sliding back onto the correct side of the-road. The coach had rotated about 90° and was being led by the driver side of the vehicle when the front of the vehicle left the bitumen road surface to the west. The front of the coach became airborne for about 7.0 metres across a deep culvert. As the front driver side of the couch impacted with the embankment on the west side of the culvert the coach rolled onto the driver side and commenced to slide. ‘The front of the coach dug into the culvert whilst the rear of the bus continued to rotate around in an anti clockwise direction. The coach remained on its driver side as it continued across the grassed culvert, The vehicle came to rest on the driver side on the west side of
the culvert ufier having rotated 180°.
At the time of the collision the road was in poor condition with severe bleeding, polishing and rutting. Both the bleeding and polishing can result in reduced friction. The severe rutting and water pooling can lead to aquaplaning. While it is not possible to determine whether the loss of control was caused by a reduced friction or aquaplaning it is highly likely that it was one of these
factors.”
The skid resistance level was calculated at well below the recommended level
of VicRoads.
Post Crash Incidents -
On the morning of 20 April 2009, a few days after the crash, Acting Sergeant
Hetherington attended the scene. He saw that the speed limit for the location had
reverted to 80kp/h, noted the poor road surface and ‘observed traffic travelling north
around the bend and noted that heavy vehicles tended to move about as they drove
down around the bend. Watching the top of the trailers, on B doubles, they would
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move up and down and pitch to the left, As the A trailer pitched to the left the B
trailer would remain straight then also pitch and roll to the left.’
two or three feet. Mr Beauglehole tried to regain control of his truck but ended up
tipping over past the right hand side of the roadway.
‘19, Constable Apps and Senior Constable Handley, attended the scene and
observed other trucks also having difficulty driving on the roadway surface.
The Coach Driver
incident occurred.
may have caused or conttibuted to the collision.
schedule on the evening of the incident and had been under no time pressure. He was
aware of the ‘Slippery when wet’ sign but felt it was some way back. Mr Shayler had difficulty pinpointing exactly where the loss of control occurred but stated that without any warming the bus failed to respond to his steering as it went through the gradual curve of the road, He had no alternative but to stccr to his left to avoid
oncoming traffic.
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thought he may have been going a bit fast for the conditions.
73kp/h.
25, Leading Senior Constable Finnegan told the inquest that during a conversation with Mr Shayler at the scene, he asked what happened and Mr Shayler replied with words to the effect of: ,
“T was coming from Portland to Heywood, coming around the corner. IJ was doing 100, the rain was easing when the back of the bus started sliding. I was heading towards oncoming traffie and then I think I overcorrected. The bus
overturned and slid over the road.”
stated:
“Just to clarify.
Alright. Pretty well I w-, I went straight out of ~ out of town. I didn’t make any announcements. because the people that were on had already been on, so I didn’t see any need to make any announcements. I headed through Bolwarra.
It was dark and I was using my high beam on and off. The roads were still a little bit wet, but besides using my — my wipers, I think just before Portland I —I don’t remember -using them on that road. Maybe — if it — ‘they just got a bit damp, { might’ve just flicked them on intermittent, but they weren't on, going all
the time.
Continuously, yeah,
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Through Bolwarra. No —no problems, Slowed down there, and then picked up
the speed again, until I came to the — the — the truck stop — what I call the truck
stop, and that’s a—a-—a curve to the — it curves to the — to the right, and then curves to the - to the left. It’s a slow curve, I don’t—I don’t know what speed I was doing, but I would have thought that I probably would’ve backed it off a litle bit, So — because I wasn’t looking, I was concentrating on the road. I wou-, I would’ve maybe backed it off to 90, but I- I can’t — because I wasn’t "looking at it I don’t know, I got to —1 did the — the — the right-hand curve fine.
When I went to take it back to the — to the left, it didn’t — it didn t go. It just wouldn’t, It went straight ahead, the — the bus physically just went ~ slid or whatever straight ahead. There was oncoming. traffic. There was two cars
coming. I know the first one was a four wheel drive,”
sweeping bend and slowed to 90kp/h,_
the case here, may be sufficient. He added that any driver who had concerns about
the performance of the coach and the road and wet weather conditions would have .
taken added caution as to the way the coach was driven.
traffic coming from the opposite direction,
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Coach Drivers Concerns
conditions with bus 38.
improve stability.
criticism whatsoever’ about their response.
Another driver, Mr Bruce, also told of his experience with bus 38 in May
The wind was apparently ‘gusting’ and the road surface poor: ‘...J was iravelling south-west, there is a sweeping right hand bend. About half way through the bend, round about-the apex of the corner, the bus started into a slide off to the left side of the road.’ Although he had another incident of ‘split second’ loss of control he had not reported this to the company as he ‘believed investigations were ongoing
within the company to rectify the problem...’.
He recounted that after participating in a test drive with the foreman he arranged for
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Koni shock absorbers tobe fitted to the front of the bus and then after further concerns were raised about wind buffeting they were also fitted to the rear. Mr Twigg indicated that this could have a very good effect on steering and handling. He agreed that if there had been further concerns he would have returned to investigate and that
if there were any other issues they were not identified by him.
distribution and overall design.
or factor in the incident that occurred.
37, The only problems Mr Shayler had experienced since the Iveco intervention
involved wind and low speed, neither of which were really a factor on 16 April 2009.
portrayed it as a ‘very minor incident that didn’t cause any concerns.”
doubt.
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had rang a company mechanic and told him that he thought it was the road.
The Bus Inspection and Mechanical Condition
4], Although the evidence of concerns with the handling characteristics suggested the possibility of something peculiar or out of the ordinary with this particular bus 38,
the numerous and intensive post incident inspections failed to reveal it.
Gambier and was known within the flect as bus 38.
43, Bus 38 suffered extensive damage during the incident including the shattering
of all the windows on the right hand side.
44, A mechanical inspection was performed by Leading Senior Constable Booth who stated: ‘Prior to and at the time of impact, this vehicle as inspected would have been classed as being in a roadworthy condition. In particular all suspension components were in good serviceable condition, I am of the opinion that it has been
mechanically well maintained.’
45, He also stated: ‘.... buses and coaches in general, are adversely affected by cross winds, poor road surface conditions, i.e. wet surfaces and smooth bitumen surfaces e.g. bitumen bleed. It appears that a combination of these conditions need to be present together with a degree of steering input i.e. negotiating a bend or curve
before a serious loss of control is. experienced..’.
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coach in this way.
47, Sergeant Carnic told the Inquest: ‘From my investigation, I couldn't identify any fault either mechanically or design wise that would indicate a component of the
vehicle contributed to the collision. '
WEBL and the Defect Notice System
48, The evidence of Messrs Lucas, the coach company management and some drivers indicated that WBL gave bus safety top priority and that neither money nor time was an issue insofar as bus repairs and maintenance were. concerned. WBL was required to maintain a Quality Assured Maintenance System’ (QAMS), and were
subject to audit by the Public Transport Safety Board of Victoria.
apparent however, that this system did not always capture the problems that some
drivers experiénced or perecived as arising from road surface or weather conditions.
The evidence from the drivers revealed itregular and inconsistent compliance with the Defect Notice System. Some drivers apparently preferred to express their concerns orally despite an awareness of the requirements of the system. One driver told the inquest ‘...J’m a person who likes to speak direct I know it’s a breach of protocol-
prefer to tell problems by word of mouth.,..get better response.,.’. He later conceded
that ifhe were being honest it came down to laziness.on the part of the driver.
breakdown in communication.
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51; By contrast, Mr Bruce told the inquest about an incident at Crossley Corner prior to the Iveco intervention, when he lost control of bus 38 on another right hand bend. He reported this incident and together with representatives from the company, VicRoads and the Moyne Shire Council, they attended the scene and decided on a rerouting of the coach given the condition of the road. Ye had no criticism of the company and their genuine desire to rectify any problems with the bus. He told the
Inquest that '..when the bus went back on the road it was in good faith,’ VicRoads
concession:
“Your Honour, it’s my instruction from VicRoads that:we acknowledge that there is sufficient evidence in the coronial brief for Your Honour to draw a _ connection between the road surface and the loss of control, and I wonder, Ye our Honour, if that might in fact shorten proceedings both in terms of the questions my friends might need to ask but also whether or not those witnesses need to be brought along. Obviously their statements still go in and it is accepted that the evidence is there, and Your Honour we wish to make it clear that VicRoads does not say that this the only factor, but we certainly do concede that there is — together with the additional evidence that has been put forward by my friend, sufficient evidence (indistinct) for Your Honour to draw a connection between
the road surface and the loss of function as well.”
53, Mr Robyn Miles, Regional Director, South Western Region, VicRoads gave evidence at the inquest. He produced a lengthy statement and was subject to extensive cross examination. {In his statement and in his evidence he conceded that
the road surface texture was poor and proposed some improvements.
which VicRoads has responsibility. He explained the VicRoads maintenance regime
and the involvement of Contractors, VicRoads Surveillance Officors and local
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Glenelg Shire staff in the roads inspection and repair process and pursuant to the
Roads Maintenance Standards.
rollover in April 2009 and Mr Beaugelhole’s paper delivery track crash in May 2009.
this location was part of the Green Triangle Freight Action Plan.
57, A brief chronology of the maintenance history of the crash site follows: ® in August 2004, following a fatality, a VicRoads inspection of the site was
performed and ‘Slippery when wet’ signs were installed and sideways force
co-efficient routine investigations machine (SCRIM) testing requested.
_® In September 2004, the SCRIM testing revealed skid resistance or surface .
exture values below the VicRoads investigatory level necessitating site inspection. ,
e In October 2004, an inspection revealed significant.texture loss.
® In December 2004, a funding bid to reseal a section of the road was launched.
-e In March 2005, Surface Inspection Rating (SRI) assessment of the crash site noted it as a candidate for water blasting, however, VicRoads decided to await he further reseal in March 2006 following the success of the earlier funding bid. ; : © Ih March 2006, a reseal was performed however, due to an error in the bidding process the work performed was 130 metres short of that previously identified as required for the site.
® In Spring 2006, another funding bid for the extra 130m reseal failed to attract funding.
e In July 2007, VicRoads received ‘the results of a Pavement Study indicating
he roughness of the road and wheel rutting were moderate,
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e Jn Spring 2007, an inspection noted that the 130m unsealed roadway was in
poor condition and the balance of the crash site needed _water blasting. The
successful funding bid that followed was limited to the 130m_reseal and did
not include any waterblasting,
e In January 2008, a further SIR survey noted texture loss and again recorded it as a candidate for waterblasting.
e In Spring 2008, an inspection of the crash site only noted low skid resistance on the 130m unsealed section. .
e In February 2009, the 130m reseal was completed.
© On 17 April 2009, a day after the bus rollover, the speed limit was reduced to 80kph
e On 6 May 2009, VicRoads received the results of a March 2009 pavement survey revealing wheel rutting, but not at a depth that would usually require remedial treatment.
e ‘On 17 May a paper delivery truck lost control upon entering the same right hand bend. . .
e On 26 May 2009, a different SCRIM testing vehicle from’ NSW performed testing which revealed varied surface friction results at the crash site, a
@ On 26 May 2009, the road was waterblasted.
© On 27 May 2009, further SCRIM test results revealed significantly increased
surface friction values for the crash site after waterblasting was performed.
April 2009. He also considered it unfortunate that in February 2009, the Contractor
who performed the extra 130m reseal did not alert VicRoads to the poor condition of
the roadway, nor had the VicRoads Surveillance officers or Glenelg shire officers
noted it during their routine inspections.
no specific provision or process for the contractor or inspectors to alert VicRoads to
the adjacent poor road condition and that previous suggestions for waterblasting had
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gone unheeded. He interpreted the Spring 2007 note about the need for water blasting, as merely a need to keep an eye on the area because there was no urgency flag or note attached to it. He also agreed that the VicRoads ‘description of intervention criteria’ for ‘safety inspections and response’ was deficient in that there was really no provision for reporting hazards such as the severe bleeding, polishing and rutting that were so apparent at this crash site. Mr Miles acknowledged that the road had also been incorrectly categorised for ‘safety inspection frequency’ explaining
that it was due to some confusion over a dual roadway number.
additional funding or change priorities which could have occurred.
several proposals:
© To conduct a review of intornal processes to address the ability of VicRoads to better use the information already in their possession. ,
« ‘To improve the reporting and feedback about how a road surface was actually d eteriorating over a period of time.
« To develop a checking process around extreme weather ¢vents.
*° Toimprove the pavement diary to clarify the extent of a work site and whether a seal needs to be extended. He suggested that when a surveillance officer goes to mark out a work site with a contractor, that would be placed in the pavement diary for checking off during the Spring maintenance check.
® ‘To identify any funding bid errors by arranging for the surveillance manager to inspect the site before any work commences and alert VicRoads to any errors and the need for more funding,
e To develop and provide a particular training module for VicRoads
Surveillance Officers.
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The Pettet/Guajardo Findings & Recommendations
62, These previous Coronial findings’, ‘with Comments and Recommendations made by the former State Coroner in July 2003, were raised during the course of the Inquest, as it was considered they may still be relevant. A comprehensive series of comments and recommendations on ‘road maintenance and risk management’ followed a lengthy inquest into five deaths that occurred when a tanker lost control in ' the wet on a dangerous section of road, crossing to the opposite lane and colliding with two oncoming vehicles causing the deaths. ‘he road surface was in poor
condition with bitumen bleeding and polished smooth appearance.
recommendations that were raised.
Passenger Evidence at Inquest
64, ‘There were eleven passengers, plus the driver on board at the time of the incident, Not all the passengers gave evidence at the Inquest. Some. passengers, quite understandably, had limited recall and different impressions of what had occurred so the evidence focussed more on where they were seated and whether they recalled any
séat belt safety messages or wore their scat belts.
65, Mr Hoggan was seated in the second seat from the back and over the back wheel on the near side, He was aware of Madison lying down behind him, Just prior to the incident he felt the coach slide to the left, close to the guard rail on the left hand side and felt stones flicking off the back wheels. Mr Hoggan could not be 100% sure that he was wearing a seat belt as he did not always wear one, He told the Inquest that the need to wear seatbelts was not generally verbalised by the drivers and he could not
recall seeing a flashing sign at the front of the bus.
3 Coroners cases Nos: 269, 270, 271, 272 & 273/01,
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the flashing seat belt sign but did not recall the driver mentioning seatbelts,
overall she was not concerned about the driver’s management of the bus,
if you were not wearing a seatbelt,
bullet’) but he also stated that it would have been travelling under the speed limit.
window seat. He was not wearing a seatbelt and was also ejected from the bus.
When he got on at Warrnambool ‘the driver made some brief statement that the ‘bus was fitted with seatbelts and required to, but usually not worn and most passengers didn’t have one on.’ He had not seen the flashing seatbelt sign. When questioned he
stated that ‘this is a pretty ineffective way of getling people to wear them..’ and
‘21 of 35
suggested that something more like an airline warning with the driver going down the aisle as being more effective. There was a need for ‘a bit of encouragement’ according to Mr Stipanov. When it was put to him that people did not need to be told he disagreed, stating ‘people become complacent.’ He had looked around the bus on ‘this day and ‘no-one was even listening, which was not an effective way of getting
people to wear seatbelts,’
New Bus safety Legislation
71, On 3] December 2010, the Bus Safety Aet 2009 (Vic) came into operation.
The purpose of this new legislation is to “provide for the safe operation of bus
services in Victoria.” The objects of this Act are to promote:- -
(a) the safety of bus services; ;
(b) the effective management of safety risks in bus services;
(o) continuous improvement in bus safety management;
(dq) public confidence in the safety of the transport of, passengers by bus; (@ the involvement of relevant stakeholders in bus safety;
i) a safety culture among persons who participate in the provision of bus
services,
responsible for administering the Act.
Expert Evidence
Dr Richardson was apparently unable to identify any mechanical and/or design defects with the bus prior to the collision and it was his opinion that the roadway
surface caused the incident.
74, A report was requested from Mr John Lambert, Safety Consultant and he gave evidence at the inquest. Mr Lambert highlighted a number of bus safety issues
including the role of seatbelts in a crash event, the use of child restraints and the
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potential survivability of this particular incident. His report also provided background
information on bus crash and fatality rates:
co Buses are generally considered to be the safest mode of road transport and fatal crash rates and fatalities have been decrcasing steadily since 1990.
Most people who are injured in bus crashes are not bus occupants. In fatal bus-involved crashes, bus occupants typically represent 30% of those who
~ dic and 40% of those hospitalised.
o Seatbelts may have an impact in reducing or eliminating occupant deaths in up to 75 to 80 per cent of fatal crashes, Circumstances where seatbelts may provide limited protection to an occupant, include severe collisions resulting in massive intrusion into the bus occupant space. Occupants may die through direct contact with other occupants, the vehicle. Seats may
sheer off the floor in very severe head on crashes.
o Adult lap-sash belts are entirely unsuitable for restraining children under 7
years old.
o There may be situations where passengers wearing scatbelts are still injured in a bus rollover, through impact with the interior of the bus. _ However, because most bus rollovers are slow, these injuries would
normally not be expected to be severe or fatal.
Seatbelt Requirements
Design Rule 68/00-Occupant Protection in Buses) 2006 (ADR68/00).
Whilst it is a requirement that child restraint anchorages be fitted in ME buses, there
is no requirement for child restraint devices to be provided.
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and child restraints is attached and marked with the letter ‘B’ (Attachment B). There appears to be no statutory obligation on parents or guardians travelling with children under the age of sixteen to ensure that the child is restrained, when on a bus fitted
with seat belts,
The Country Mayors Association of NSW recently called for the mandatory
installation of seat belts in school buses.®
Improving Seatbelt Compliance :
whether or not they would.
cautioned passengers about their legal obligation to wear seat belts as fitted and provided. Some issucd the warning at every major stop, whilst others like Mr Shayler
only issued it at the'start of the journcy. One acknowledged that they should do it
http://www. infrastructure. goy.au/roads/safety/seatbeltsforkids/index.aspx#subsidy
5 bttpv//www.mynrma.com.au/images/About-PDF/NRMA-Seeing Red_on Roads-
Roadmap for the _nexi NSW_Govt-March 2011-2:pdf
6 hutp://www. coffscoastadvacate, com.au/story/2011/03/25/country-mayors-support-belt-up- ~campaign!
24 of 35
_more often than they did. Another did not commence the warning until he had driven
further out of town.
and a seat belt is available, they are required to wear them — just as they do in a car.
bus, as they do in a car,
training.
drivers was important as not all occupants may be able to read.
Seatbelts for Expectant Mothers
necessary.
’ Tyanseript 9 December 2010, page 591,
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does not put pressure on the foetus.
Child Restraints”
restraint anchor fittings.
88, It is anomalous that no suitable restraints arc made available to infants and young children, while adults are expected to be restrained, The OCI in their report recommended that the Public Transport Division of the Department of Transport, in consultation with the BIC, review the requirement for child safety harnesses on long
distance road coaches,
89, Mr Apps told the inquest that the BIC does not have a national policy position on this issue, nor has the issue ever been raised in the eight years he has been Executive Director. The complexities of introducing child restraints onto the bus fleet
became apparent during the course of the inquest. Some issues included:
e How many different types of child restraints are necessary to safely
accommodate children ranging in age and size from infants to young
children? In evidence, Mr Lambert stated that anchorage points are designed to be standardised and there are essentially three distinct types of.
child restraints needed, before graduating to an adult seat belt:
o Under six months — baby restraint/capsule with in-built harness.
o Six months to under four years —- child restraint with in-built harness.
26 of 35
o Four to seven years’+ booster seat with seat belt or hamess; or a child restraint with in-built harness.”
Who would be responsible for providing such devices — the parents or the
bus operators? Parents and guardians who do not own a car would not
possess a child restraint and therefore would not be able to supply their
“own device. One could not reasonably expect a parent or carer to. carry a
child seat along with their child.
If the bus company provided child restraint devices, how many. devices -
would be required per vehicle? Discussions on this issue were limited as Mr Apps noted that the industry could not determine with any certainty the patronage of young children and Hence the number of restraints necessary.
Tt was noted that child numbers may increase during particular times such as school holidays.
Who would be required to fit the child restraint to the seat — parents or bus
_ drivers? If bus drivers were required to fit the devices, they would need to
reccive the appropriate training lo appropriately install the devices. Some
bus drivers who gave evidence at the inquest indicated disapproval of the onus being placed on drivers.
Hygienic issues associated with using a communal seat were raised,
Possible avenues to advise parents and puardians on the need for children
to be restrained and the potential to bring along their own restraint was
discussed. Mr Apps noted that most people nowadays booked tickets
online or over the phoné. If this were the case, bus companies could ensure the required number of restraints were made available at the
commencement of the route trip.
Clearly, there are a range of operational challenges to address,
° Refer also to VicRoads’ Choosing and using Child Restraints and Booster Seats (cffective 9 November 2009)
27 of 35
Post Mortem Medical Examination
the cause of death, The Families
91, The familics of Ms Brady, her daughter Madison Dobie and Mr Pomery attended the Inquest and were devastated by the most unfortunate and regrettable loss of three young lives in this incident. They raised concerns over the apparent failure of VicRoads to, repair the roadway in a timely manner and the need to cneourage seat
belt compliance.
Acknowledgements
1 wish to particularly thank and acknowledge the role of the police investigating member, the police assistant, coronial staff and members. of the Coroners Prevention
Unit!” for their co-ordination, support and assistance.
The Coroners Prevention Unit is a specialist service for coroners created to strengthen their
prevention role and provide them with professional assistance on issues pertaining to public heath and safety. .
28 of 35
Comments and Findings
Pursuant to section 67 of the Coroners Act 2008, Timake the following comments and findings connected with this death:
it was impossible to determine exactly why the coach initially crossed over onto the
wrong side of the road but I -find that it was related to the poor road surface.
VicRoads made a sensible concession about the condition of the roadway and proposed some partly implemented improvements however, it is a pity that it took an
incident such as this for that to occur,
Whilst acknowledging the vast road network responsibilities of VicRoads and the limited-road maintenance budget, this particular section of road had been in a very bad way for several years with blecding, polishing, rutting and loss of road surface texture, There was a fatality in 2004, a crash in 2006 and at least one other close by, together with increasing heavy vehicular traffic flow however the reporting regime, prioritisation and resources surrounding inspection, monitoring, identification,
signage, funding, maintenance and repair went awry.
Tt was extraordinary that one section of roadway could be repaired whilst another adjacent section was left in bad condition. In the years prior to this incident VicRoads inspections had identified the site as needing water blasting but that was not performed until after this incident occurred and the excuses surrounding the intervening delay were unsatisfactory. Although relevant, it was not good enough to
" blame recent extreme weather or suggest that responsibility lay with others.
The system was flawed and protracted and failed to adequately identify hazards and manage tisk as it should have done under the Road Management Plan. Whilst that ‘Plan was intended to manage risk, it was found wanting and unable to effectively gather or use information on this occasion. An expanded checklist and internal system to encourage and support the reporting of risks and maintenance and signage
requirements was needed.
29 of 35
It is apparent that VicRoads did consider and at least partially act on the recommendations of the Pettet/Guajardo findings, however those recommendations still have such general application for the management of risk that they remain
relevant today and apply equally to the site of this incident.
‘Vhe former State Coroner wrote in a Summary :
“As with most large and small government agencies there is always a need to learn from events and continually work on improving processes. The deaths examined in this inquest have tested VicRoads own systems and identified significant areas for improvement, In summary VicRoads systems for identifying and dealing with significant maintenance problems that had
potential to adversely effect safety have failed.”
So too in- this incident, VicRoads systems for identifying and fixing a similar maintenance problem to the Pettet/Guajardo incident failed despite it having responsibility for ensuring that road maintenance problems do not adversely effect
safety.
I find:
The poor road surface and low friction values were. responsible for this
incident occurring.
The 100km/h speed designation was probably excessive and the slippery when wet warning sign was inadequate to warn traffic of the poor road surface
conditions,
VicRoads system for, management of risk, hazard identification, road
maintenance, funding and repair were inadequate.
30 of 35
Che coach was well maintained and no mechanical or design defects were detected.
The evidence that bus 38 had particular handling problems was not sufficiently made out to support a finding that this may, of itself or in combination, caused this incident to occur, I concluded that the handling problems some drivers complained about were
more likely duc to prevailing weather, wind or road conditions.
Although it did not necessarily impact on this incident, shortcomings were identified in the communication of driver concerns and the operation of the Defeet Notice System. It is apparent that the bus operators will nccd to be increasingly active and vigilant with their systems surrounding these issues particularly given the provisions of the new Bus Safety Act.
T find:
The bus was well maintained and there was no apparent mechanical or design
defect in the bus that caused the loss of control in this incident .
The WBL system for communication of driver concerns and the completing of
Defect Notices failed to operate as it should.
Although there was a suggestion thal Mr Shayler may have entered the road curvature " too fast for the prevailing conditions, neither his speed nor his driving of the bus in
general could be considered inappropriate.
I find:
Mr Shayler was not responsible for this incident.
31 of 35
The bus industry has a good safety record to date. Bus travel is considered the safest mode of road transport in Australia however that does not diminish the importance of continuous improvement. The demand for bus services together with bus passenger numbers will inevitably increase as the population grows and people are encouraged
‘to make better use of public transport.
While buses are considered to have a low probability of experiencing a crash, the consequences, including the potential loss of life arc substantial given the high
number of occupants on board at any one time.
Scatbelt compliance was poor and there was a prevailing culture of not buckling up.
A veal shift in public perception about bus safety is necessary as is the importance of wearing the available seatbelt, as required by current law. The importance of seatbelts for school children travelling’ on high speed coaches, whilst an ancillary issue, has
also been highlighted in this inquest.
The absence of.any form of child restraint being available on buses is unsatisfactory.
While there may be operational and practical difficulties associated with fitting child restraints, 1 am confident that they could be overcome through sensible collaboration
and co-operation belween all interested parties.
In a recent coronial finding into an Egyptian bus crash in which five Victorians died, Coroner Spanos commented that “the wearing of scatbelts could potentially have prevented ejection from the bus and saved some lives and ameliorated some
injurics.” \
It is also apparent from the evidence of Mr Lambert thal seat belts are not an isolated:
measure to protect bus occupants in the event of a crash and a different approach to
bus window design-may be possible whereby they flex and contain occupants rather-
than break as was the case here.
1 coronial findings nos.219-223/2006
32 of 35
This new Bus Safety Act appears to be a significant reform in transport safely in Victoria and offers a proactive approach to risk identification and management in the bus industry. ‘The concept of “shared responsibility’ between bus operators, regulators “and patrons emphasises the move towards a bus safety culture, which
should address many of the safety issues identified by this investigation.
I find:
Ms Sabrina Brady, Madison Dobie and Mr Justin Pomery may have survived
and their unfortunate deaths prevented had they all been properly restrained.
33 of 35
Recommendations
Pursuant to section 72(2) of the Coroners Act 2008, I make the following recommendations connected with this death.
this finding, and the Comments and Recommendations from Pettet/-Guajardo and implement a “best practice” system for inspecting, monitoring, auditing, funding and repairing road surfaces to minimise the risk of crashes, This system should also incorporate specific considerations relatitig to the incidence of extreme climate events
and road surface management.
Recommendations relating to road maintenance and risk.
Such messages would need to emphasise the importance of scat belts in the event of a
crash, and the applicable penalties for failing to comply.
monetary penaltics associated with non-compliance.
34 of 35
bus,
awareness of the importance of seat belts.
8 I recommend that ‘Transport Safety Victoria monitor seatbelt compliance rates on buses operating in Victoria to evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives taken (as
recommended above) to improve compliance.
measures in addition to seat belts, including retentive window glazing.
Signature:
CATON Qe et ap we eye
Heather Spooner Coroner 30 March 2011
Distribution List:
Stephen Lucas, Managing Director — Warrnamboo! Bus & Motor Company
Michael Apps, Executive Director - Bus Industry Confederation of Australia
lan McCallum, Chief Investigator Transport Safety
4, Alan Osborne, Director - Transport Safety Victoria
The Hon. Mr ‘Terry Mulder MP, Minister for Public Transport and Minister for Roads
Jim Betts, Secretary — Department of Transport
Simon Overland, Chief Commissioner - Victoria Police
Gary Liddle, Chief Executive - VicRoads ;
Nick Dimopoulos, Chief Executive - National Transpor! Commission
35 of 35
VicRoads Letter
In the Inquest of:
Sabrina Michelle Brady 2038/09 Madison Lee Dobie 2039/09
Justin Ross Pomery _ 2040/09
146 William Street Meibourne Vic’ 3000 PO Box 4301 Melbourne Vie 3004
: \ a me . . ‘ee Australia Ls & PHILU PS FOR BX 147 Melbourne ~ . 5 Tal +61 3 9274. 5000
_ Fax +64 39274 5114 www.cdlaphilllpsiox,com
Ourtef! RAW:0471253
23 December 2010
Remo Antolini
Coroher's Assistants Unit Coroners Court : Level 14
222 Exhibition Street
DearRemo : . , : | Re: Inquest into the deaths of Brady and others
The Coroner has asked VicRoads to describe how It responded to Recommendations 2 and 3 in the Inquest into the Deaths of Pettet and others on the South Cippstand Hwy at Koo Wee Rup In January 2004, oo,
Recommendation 2 was:
That improvements need to be made to the data collection and ‘computer software systems at VicRoads to ensure that alf data collected whether from the pubilo, internal reports on problems with maintenance or-the state of the road, accident information, etc, be able to be automatically cross referenced to ensure that, as a minimum, the extent of the problem Is recognised and the risk evaluated and managed (within the bounds of practically and resouroes),
It is essential that the data systems ‘actually work to proactively identify and manage the information in a timely way.
VicRoads responded to this recommendation by Introducing ihe Enquiry Tracking” System (ETS). The ETS fs used to record and track enquirles and complaints from the public recelved via VicRoads’ call centres and customer service centres and its website, including complaints and enquiries about road hazard management. Enquiries and complaints about the state of the road are tracked and monitored. The risk is evaluated and actions required to mitigate the problem are identified, The ETS also captures information about crashes and other Incidents that are notified to VicRoads.
Each enquiry or complaint is allocated to a VicRoads officer for action, and the system sends rerninders of the action iterns until the matter Is dealt with and closed off,
DLA Phitips Fox fs a member of
Please notify us if this communication has been sent to you by mistake. ifithas been, any client legal DLA Piper Group, an alliance of er 5 . wae Independent lagal practices. His a privilege Is not walved or lost and you are not entitled fo use it in any way, separeta end distinct legal ently,
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Recommendation 3 was:
That VicRoads examine tlie Issue of éstabitshing a well resourced special rapid response feam(s) in each region supporting road mainteriance teams and surveillance officers and helping to identify and dealing with managing identified areas of increased tsk as a result of road surface maintenance probleins.
The teams would be managed by a centralised unit answerable to the Chief Executive Officer. i
The teams In each region would need to be multi-disciplinary (engineers, risk managers, analysts, ete), have special skills and expertise in identifying areas of risk (with the ability to have on-site aocess to relevant VicRoads data systems relating to read safety planning and maintenance) countermeasures, signally or int combination in a timely manner (le temporary road signage, speed limit reductian, ete} ;
Such a unif could also assist with in the training of maintenance teams and surveillance officers to help them Identify other potential areas of risk potentially encountered in the daily routine of maintenance work and thereby further assisting In better targeting areas of increased risk, Subcontractors also need fo be trained in any néw procedures fo help in the risk management process.. : . .
Finally, safely needs to be the focus of the unit’s work and any problems also need to be eonsiderad from the motorist’s perspective, .
VicRoads considered this recommendation along with all the recommendations directed at it in the Pettet Inquest, It has not implemented the system described by the Coroner In the Pettet Inquest, However, VicRoads almed for similar outcomes by developing its skid resistance polley. This policy - provides for VicRoads to respond to a member of the public, munlelpality, or VieRoads whe expresses @ concern that a road sirface ts contributing to crashes or the potential for crashes. Aspart of the process under this policy, VicRoads analyses ihe crash history of the lecatlon, carries “out site, inspections, and if itls datermined that road safety could be enhanced by improving skid resistance, then skid resistance Is measured to enable a business case to be prepared for funding the improvement. Independently of this policy, VioRoads also carries cut Inspections of locations on arterial roads whete fatal crashes have occurred, as well as carrying out regular malntenance ‘Inspection under the Road Management Plan. You will recail that Mr Miles gave evidence touching _ upon these Issues at the laquest hearing. .
}
Yours sincerely’
Rachel Walsh ' Elana Oreilly .
Partner . : Solicitor
Direct +61 3 9274 5223 Direct +61 292745219 | rachel. walsh@dlaphillipsfox.com elana.oreilly@diaphillipsfox.com
Fitting and Wearing of Seatbelts
In the Inquest of:
Sabrina Michelle Brady 2038/09 Madison Lee Dobie 2039/09
Justin Ross Pomery 2040/09
Requirement to wear seatbelts in Victorian Buses
Rule 265 of both the Road Safety (Road Rules) Regulations 1999 (“former Rules’’) " and its successor, the Road. Safety Road Rules 2009' (“current Rules”) require that a passenger in a motor vehicle of 16 years or older is to “ocoupy a seating position that is fitted with a seatbelt; and...must wear the seatbelt properly adjusted and fastened,” '. when the vehicle is either moving or stationary (but not parked), Moreover, both the former and current Rules do not spécify the categories of motor vehicles to which Rule 265 applies, and thus would extend to passengers on a ME bus. ‘
Driver’s Obligations
Both the former ‘and current Rules place an onus on the driver of the motor vehicle? — but not being a bus or taxi — to ensure that each passenger who is 16 years old or older complies with Rule 266 which details the requirement for persons aged under 16 years old to be scatbelt restrained in motor vehicles, and specifies the type of restraint which is age dependent).
Another piece of legislation worth considering is the Bus Safety Act (Vic) 2009, which came into operation on 31 December 2010. Section 15 of that Act provides that an ‘operator’ (see footnote 3 for the definition)’ of a bus service must so far as is reasonably practicable ensure the safety of the bus service. This concept of ensuring safety is detailed further in section 14, whereby a bus service operator must eliminate all risks to safety so far.as is reasonably practicable; and where it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to safety, to reduce those risks so far as is reasonably practicable. In determining what is reasonably pr acticable, section 14(2) sets out a list of mattcrs that must be considered in determining what is reasonably practicable in relation to ensuring safety’.
The following pages contain extracts from relevant legislation.
‘ Which came into operation on 9 November 2009 Lo
? The definition of “motor vehicle” in the Road Safety Act 1 986, means “a vehicle that is used or intended to be used on a highway and that is built to be propelled by a motor that forms part of the vehicle..
3 An‘ operator’ is defined as “the person who is responsible for controlling or directing the operations of a bus service in connection with a business or activity for, or involving, the transport of passengers by road by that bus service, but does not include a person who merely— (a) arranges for the registration of a bus; or (b) maintains or arranges for the maintcnance of a bus”. Given this definition (and the reference to““driver” in other parts of the Act), it does not appear that the definition of “operator” includes the bus driver.
4 These matters include: (a) the likelihood of the hazard or tisk concerned eventuating; (b) the degree of harm that would result if the hazard or risk oventuated; (c) what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, about the hazard or risk and any ways of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk; (d) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the hazard or risk; (e) the cost of eliminating or reducing the hazard or tisk.
Extract of relevant legislation
Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule 68/00 — Occupant Protection in
Buses) 2006
nm
two bo
Ww ua
The function of this ADR is to specify, for certain amnibuses.
requirements for seatbelts, the strength of Seats‘, seat-anchorages, seatbelt ‘ducharages’ and ‘Child Restraint Anchorages’, and provisions for protecting occupants from impact with Sear’ backs and accessories on ‘Seats’ and armrests.
Subject to the following clause, this ADR applies to the design and construction of vehicles as set out in the table below.
This ADR does not apply to ‘Route Service Oniibuses’, oF omnibuses with less fhan 17 ‘Sears “including the driver and crew, or vehicles in which all passenger ‘Seats’ have a ‘Reference Height’ of less than 1.0 metre.
ROUTE SERVICE OMNIBUS - an omnibus specially designed with spaces for standing passengers, : : . .
Vehicles certified ta the requirements of an acceptable prior rule, as shown below in the Applicability Table for a particular category, ave deemed to comply with this rule.
ADR UNECE Category Category | Manufactured | Acceptable
Vehicle Categary Code Code on or After Prior Rules
4.1.
Heavy omnibus ME | M3 | 1 fuly 1994 nil
Refer to Vehicle Standard (Australian Design Rule Definitions ancl Vehicle Categories) 2005,
wn
ea ae
as fe
un = _
un * bo
All ‘Seats’ with a ‘Reference Height’ greater than 1.0 metre, other than driver's ‘Seat’, must meet the requirements set out in this rule.
Seatbelt Assemblies
Each, ‘Seaf* must be equipped with a ‘Seatbelt Assembhy’.
The Seatbelt Assembly’ of front-facing ‘Segis’ must be a Lap-Sash Belt’
equipped with an ‘Anergency Locking Retractor’ as specified in ADR
Seatbelt Anchorages
‘Seats’ must be equipped with seatbelt ‘dnehorages’ which for:
all front-facing ‘Seats’ must have anchorages for pelvic and upper torso restraint, as specified in clause 11, and Provision for Child Restraints At least six ‘Seis’ in the vehicle must be provided with ‘Child Restraint Anchor Fittings’ or, at the ‘Adanufacturer’s’ option, ‘Child Restraint
anchorages’ and ‘Child Restraint Anchor Fittings’ meeting the requirements specified in ADR 34/....
Road Safety Act 1986: jus means a motor vehicle which (together with any trailer attached to it) seats more than 12 adults (including the driver};
motor veliicla means a vehicle that is used or intended to be used on a highway and that is built to be propelled by a motor that forms patt of the vehicle but does not nclude—
(a) a vehicle intended to be used on a ' railway or tramway; or
fb} 4 motorised wheel-chair capable of a speed of not more than 10 kilometres per hour which is used solely for the conveyance of an injured or disabled person: or ,
(c) a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle by
virtue of a declaration under subsection (2){b): |
8.30} det. of bus
inserted by - No. Saoai s. ACVB).
Road Safety (Road Rules) Regulations 1999 (note these Regulations have been superseded by the Road Safety Road Rules 2009 on 9 Novernber 2009)
266,
(1)
A passenger in or on a motor vehicle that is moving, or Is stationary but not parked, must comply with this rule if the passenger is 16 years old, or older.
Penalty: 5 penalty units.
Note Motor vehicle is defined in the Road Safety Act 1986, and park is defined in the dictionary.
Wearing of seatbelfs by passengers under 16 years old
(1)
The driver of a motor vehicle (except a bus or motor bike) that is moving, or is stationary but not parked, must ensure that this rule is complied with for each passenger in or on the vehicle who is under 16 years old.
Penalty: 5 penalty unfts.
Nofe Bus and motor vehicle are defined in the Road Safety Act 1986, and motor bike and park are defined in tha dictionary,
f the passenger is under 1 year ald, and not exempt from wearing a seatbelt under rule 267, the passenger must be restrained in a suitable approved child estraint that is properly fastened and adjusted, unless the driver is exempt from this subrule under subrule (5).
Note Approved child restraint is defined in subrule (7).
fthe passenger is at least 1 year old but under 16 years old, and not exempt rom wearing a seatbelt under rule 267, the passenger must be restrained in a sultable approved child restraint that is properly fastened and adjusted, or occupy a seating position fitted with a suitable seatbelt and wear the seatbelt properly adjusted and fastened, if a suitable approved child restraint, or a seating position fitted with a suitable seatbelt, is available in the motor vehicle for the passenger.
If the motor vehicle has 2 or more rows of seats, the passenger must not be in the front row of seats unless the passenger is restrained in a suitable approved child restraint or occupying a seating position fitted with a seatbelt.
The driver of a public minibus or taxi is exempt from subrule (2) In relation to a passenger if—
(a) there is no suitable approved child restraint available in the minibus or taxi for the passenger; and
(b) ifthe minibus or taxi has 2 or more rows of seats—the Passenger is not in the front row of seats,
Note = Public minibus and taxi are defined In the dictionary.
267.’ Exemptions from wearing seatbelts
(1)
(2)
(3)
(5)
A person is exe that it would be wear a seatbelt.
A person in oro
(a)
the ‘perso
mpt from weari impracticable,
na motor vehic
n is engaged
ng a seatbelt if the Corporation has certified undesirable or inexpedient for the person to
e is exempt from wearing a seatbelt it—
in the door-to-door delivery or collection of
in the collection of waste or garbage, and is required to gat
the vehicle, or
goods, or
in or outo
(b) the vehic Note
e is not travelli
on or off the vehicle, at frequent intervals; and
hg over 25 kilometres per hour.
Motor vehicle is defined in the Road Safety Act 1986.
A person is exempt from wearing a seatbelt if—
(a)
() (il)
the person (or, for a passenger, the driver of the vehicle in which the person is a passenger) is carrying a certificate signed by a registered medical practitioner certifying that because of—
medical unfitness; or physical disability—
it is impracticable, undesirable or inexpedient that the person wear a seatbelt: and
(b} the person is complying with the conditions (if any) stated in the
certificate
and
(c) _ the certificate shows the date on which the exemption expires.
However, a person is not exempt under subrule (3) from wearing a seatbelt if the person (or, for a passenger, the driver of the vehicle in which the person is a passenger) does not immediately produce the certificate mentioned in the subrule for inspection wien a police officer or authorised person asks the person (or the driver) whether the person is exempt from wearing a seatbelt.
Note
Authorised person and police officer are defined in the dictionary.
A passenger in a police or emergency vehicle is exempt from wearing 4
seatbelt, Note
Emergency vehicle and police vehicle are defined in the dictionary.
Road Safety Road Rules 2009 (came into operation on 9 November 2009):
263 Wearing of seatbelis by passengers 16 years old, ar older
(1) A passenger in or on a motor velticle that is moving, or that is stationary but not parked, must comply with subrule (2) ifhe or she—
(a) is 16 years old or older; and
(b) is not exempt from wearing a seatbelt under ‘rnle 267.
Penalty: 10 penalty units.
(2) The passenger—
(a) must occupy a seating position that is fitted with a seatbelt; and
(c) must wear the seatbelt properly adjusted and fastened.
(3) The driver of a motor vehicle (except a bus or taxi) that is moving, or that is stationary but not parked. must ensure that each passenger in or on the vehicle who is 16 years old or older complies with subrule (2), unless the passenger is exempt from wearing a seatbelt under rule 267.
Penalty: 10 penalty units.
266 Wearing of seatbelts by passengers under 16 years old
(1) The driver of a motor vehicle (except a bus or motor bike) that is moving, or is stationary but hot parked, must ensure that this rule is complied with for each passenger in or on the vehicle who is under 16 years old.
Penalty: 10 penalty units.
(2A) If the passenger is 6 months old or older, but is less than 4 years old, he or she must be restrained in a suitable and properly fastened and adjusted—
{a} rearward facing approved child restraint: or
(b} forward facing approved child restraint that has an inbuilt harness.
(3) A passenger who is under 4 years old must not be in the front row of a motor vehicle that has 2 or more rows of seats.
(3A) A passenger who is 4 years old or older, but is less than 7 years old, must not be in the front row of a motor vehicle that has 2 or more rows of seats unless all of the other seats in the row or rows
_ behind the front row are occupied by passengers who are also under 7 years old.
(5) Subject to subrile (5A), the driver of a public minibus or taxi is exempt from subrules (2), (2A) and (2B) in relation to'a passenger if—
(a) there is no suitable approved child restraint available in the minibus or taxi for the passenger: and
(bh) if the minibus or taxi has 2 or more rows of seats—the passenger is notin the front row of seats.
Note
Public minibus and texi ave defined in the dictionary.
267 Exemptions from wearing seatbelts
(1A) A person in or on a motor vehicle is exempt from wearing a seatbelt if—
(a) the seating position that he or she occupies is not fitted with a seatbelt; and
(b) there is no requirement for that seating position to be fitted with a seatbelt: and
(e) all passengers in the vehicle who are exempt from wearing a seatbelt are complying with subrule (8).
(1B) Subrule (1A) does not apply to a person who is uader 7 years old.
(1C) To aveid doubt, subrule (1A) does not authorise a passenger to whom subrule 266(3) or (3.4) applies to occupy a seat in the front row of seats in a vehicle that has 2 or more rows of seats.
(8) Ifa vehicle does not have seatbelts or approved child restraints fitted to all its passenger seating positions, 4 passenger who is exempt from
wearing a seatbelt under this rule must not occupy
a seating position that is fitted with a seatbelt or
an approved child restraint if the result would be
that a passenger who is not exempt from wearing
a seatbelt under this rule would be required to
accupy a seating position that is not fitted with ¢
seatbelt or an approved child restraint.
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